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The truth is incontrovertible. Panic may resent it;
ignorance may deride it; malice may distort it,
but there it is.
--Winston Churchill
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the history of the United States, many of the most important and
widely covered news stories have dealt with the nation's many wars. Lande (1995)
points out that because of their unique capacity to encompass a wide range of human
emotions, wars have long been important journalistic events:
Whether the nation turned to anned conflict to gain independence, to fight off
invasion, to protect national unity, or to further democracy, the hostilities
characterized Americans in a way no other events have done. It could hardly be
otherwise, for no other events were so critical in shaping the destiny ofa nation.
Nothing touched directly or indirectly the lives of so many people. In no other
circumstances were the lines between good and evil, friend or foe, so clearly
drawn.
Because the media plays such an important role in providing the public with
information about U.S. military conflicts, there has often been tension between the
military and media concerning what information should be reported and what should be
withheld from the public. The military and government argue that certain restrictions
should be placed on the media to control the reporting of information that could threaten
the lives of military personnel, along with national security. The press, on the other hand,
argues that the military and government should not be given free reign during wartime,
and should be held accountable for providing misleading information to the U.S. public.
As a result of the tensions that have evolved between the press and military throughout
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the history of the United States, the types of news stories that have been reported during
different conflicts have varied greatly in content.
Background
The content of news stories dealing with U.S. military conflicts has been shaped
by many different factors, including current social, economic and political climates of the
nation. Another significant factor in detennining the differences in the content ofnews
stories dealing with different military conflicts is the technological capability of the press
at the time. As news gathering and reporting technology increases, so does the timeliness
ofnews reports. However, as advancements in news reporting technology have
increased, the military has responded with increases in information restriction and
censorship. Because of technological changes in the way the press was able to report
news during different wars, the relations between the military and press, along with the
content ofresulting news reports, have differed greatly in each conflict.
In the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, during the American
Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War, military censorship of news was
virtually non-existent (Gannett, 1991). However, with the rapidly increasing use ofthe
telegraph in the 1850s, the press gained the ability to report news in a much more timely
manner, allowing reporting ofmilitary conflicts almost "as they happened" (Mermin,
1999). As a result of the technological advances that allowed the media to report news
more quickly, the military quickly established information restriction guidelines for the
press during wartime.
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3During World War I, government censorship ofthe press was more restrictive
than it had ever been throughout U.S. history. Two Congressional Acts characterized the
increasing power of the government to control news coverage of U.S. military conflicts:
the Espionage Act of 1917, and the Sedition Act of 1918.
The Espionage Act of 1917 prohibited the publication of any information that
might offer aid to the enemy. It also prohibited publication of information that might
interfere with U.S. military operations or war production (Fox, 1995). The Sedition Act
of 1918 prohibited criticism or negative remarks about the U.S. military or government.
It also prohibited negative comments about the U.S. flag, military unifonns, or other
military symbols. Offenders ofeither Act could be sentenced to 20 years in prison or
given a $10,000 fine (Fox, 1995). Both the Espionage Act ofl917 and the Sedition Act
of 1918 were declared constitutional by the Supreme Court.
As the U.S. became involved in World War II, the legal and scholarly debate
regarding the restrictions imposed on the press during World War I caused the
government to take a more subtle approach to press censorship (Carrigan, 1997).
However, the first restrictions were placed on the media on December 3], 1940, nearly
one year before the attack on Pearl Harbor, when Navy Secretary Frank Knox asked the
media not to report on topics such as troop movements or the construction ofnew ships
without prior authorization (Carrigan, 1997).
After the U.S. entered the war, the Office of Censorship issued the Code of
Wartime Practices, a set of guidelines for journalists to observe voluntarily (Carrigan,
1997). The censorship of military information was ultimately left to individual field
commanders, though, and most sought to strictly control the infonnation available to
4reporters along with the resulting news reports (Crabtree, 1995). The censorship policies
in World War II were made more cumbersome for reporters due to the large volume of
information transmitted by "official" military sources. While censors often delayed
publication ofreporters' news stories, the military's official press releases were made
available more quickly, thereby making the correspondents' reports essentially "old
news" (Faulkner, 1981).
Unlike the censorship policies of World War II, the press acted in the early stages
of the Korean War under an entirely voluntary censorship agreement with the military.
However, with the entry of China into the war, along with the resulting retreat of United
Nations forces, the military soon abandoned the voluntary censorship policy toward the
press in favor of increased control of the news content being sent to the United States.
Under the military's new policies, journalists were required to submit all news reports to
Anny censors before publication or airing in the United States (Gannett, 1991).
During the years between the Korean War and American involvement in Vietnam,
the military planned continuously in the area ofcensorship for future conflicts. After the
TonlGn Gulf resolution in 1964, which authorized the large-scale deployment of U.S.
military forces in Vietnam, the military decided against the implementation ofa
censorship policy toward the press (Hanunond, 1988). Military leaders rationalized that
the alienation ofthe press corps in Vietnam would weaken public support for American
military involvement in the region (Gannett, 1991). Instead, the military developed an
entirely voluntary system of censorship for the press, asking reporters to follow similar
guidelines as those used during World War II. Throughout the Vietnam War, the U.S.
military never imposed an official censorship policy upon the press (Hammond, 1988).
The invasion ofGrenada by U.S. military forces in 1983 marked the end ofthe
voluntary censorship policies ofthe press used during Vietnam. The military s total ban
on press access during the brief conflict was due in large part to the perceived failures of
the voluntary censorship policies used during Vietnam. The press ban succeeded in
allowing the military to operate in the combat zone free of media criticism. It also
brought about a compromise between the military and press regarding censorship
practices for future conflicts. In 1984 the Sidle Report was released, which laid out
general guidelines for press coverage of future conflicts (Gannett, 1991).
After Grenada, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaJf, General John Vessey,
convened the Sidle Panel to review the actions of the military in dealing with the press
during the U.S. military action in Grenada. The panel concluded that military operations
should have open media coverage whenever possible. For operational security, though, it
suggested establishing a small pool ofmembers of the media to cover any future
operation until open coverage could be arranged. As a result of the panel's
recommendations, the Department of Defense (DOD) National Media Pool (DNMP) was
established in 1985 (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995).
The National Media Pool, which consists ofup to 16 members ofthe media and
three military escort officers, was structured by the military to provide media coverage of
military activities until a situation has been stabilized to enable open media coverage.
Once open coverage has been achieved, the pools were to be disbanded (Powell, 1990).
When U.S. troops were sent to the Persian Gulf in 1990, they were eventually
accompanied by a press pool consisting of 17 members of the press, along with six public
infonnation officers (Baroody, 1998). The press pool system consisted of small groups
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ofmedia professionals who were allowed limited access to combat areas and military
personnel while accompanied by military information officers, and became the dominant
form of press restriction during Desert Storm.
Following Desert Stonn, members of the media again criticized the military's
methods ofcontrolling and filtering news information. As a result of the media's
dissatisfaction with the news coverage of Desert Stonn, representatives ofthe media and
the Pentagon worked together to develop the Department of Defense (DOD) Principles
for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations, which were published in 1992. The
document highlighted existing concepts and procedures used by the military in dealing
with the press during conflicts, but also emphasized to military commanders the
importance of their personal involvement in planning for news coverage ofcombat
operations (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995).
Statement of the Problem
Journalists in the United States have an obligation, whether during peacetime or
war, to provide the public with objective, unbiased reporting ofeach day's news.
Certainly, though, the obligations of the news media become more complex during times
of U.S. military conflict. Issues ofnational security and the safety of both civilians and
members of the military call for more careful consideration by the press regarding what
information should be published and what should be withheld from public record. News
reports that are published, however, must be held to the same professional and ethical
journalistic standards as any other reports. Information gained from government or
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military sources should be scrutinized and evaluated for accuracy, but no more or less
than professional journalism standards call for regarding other types of sources. In other
words, a tendency by the press to have predetennined expectations toward the validity of
information disseminated from military or government sources, whether positive or
negative, creates a potential for bias in news reporting.
This study will examine the content of news stories printed in selected
publications during Vietnam, post-Vietnam U.S. military involvements, and the Persian
Gulf War for the influence of the changing nature of the military's philosophy of
information control.
Objectives
The overall objective ofthis study is to detennine the extent to which the selected
publications: The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, and The Chica 0 Tribune
fulfilled their roles as un-biased. objective reporters of news. This study is intended to
answer the following general research questions: 1) What effects, ifany, did the news
gathering and reporting guidelines imposed by the military on the press during Vietnam
have on the news reports dealing with that conflict? 2) What effects, ifany, did the news
information gathering and reporting guidelines imposed by the military on the press in
the conflicts between Vietnam and Desert Stonn have on the news reports dealing with
those conflicts? 3) What effects, ifany, did the news information gathering and reporting
guidelines imposed by the military on the press during Desert Storm have on the news
reports dealing with that conflict?
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8Significance of the Study
Much has been written and studied about the media coverage of both the Vietnam
War and the Persian GulfWar, along with the lower-scale military conflicts that took
place between the two wars. There have been both qualitative and quantitative studies
conducted that discuss the relationships between the military and press in each war, along
with the news reports that were published. However, a gap in the current research exists
concerning a directly comparative quantitative content analysis of the news reports
dealing with U.S. military conflict from Vietnam to the Persian Gulf War. Through
direct comparison of the news coverage of the conflicts, this study will attempt to show
the possible correlations between the types of news reports published and the evolution of
the military's guidelines dealing with the press during wartime.
Study Limitations
This study looks only at newspaper coverage of U.S. military involvements, and
does not take into account television, magazine, or other types ofnews coverage.
Although television has played a vital role in the evolution of news coverage during
wartime, the amount and variety oftelevision news reports dealing with the conflicts
studied was beyond the scope of this study.
Also, the sample size used for this study may not accurately represent the most
common tyPes ofnews reports published during each conflict because of the relatively
brief period of conflict during the Persian Gulf War compared to the Vietnam War.
This study can be related only to newspaper coverage and cannot be generalized
or extended to include other types ofmedia. Also, only news stories were used in this
study. Advertisements, letters to the editor, and other non news-related items were not
used in this study.
The newspapers selected for this study are large, urban-based newspapers, each
with circulation numbers over 2 million. As a result, the results of the study cannot be
generalized to smaller, more rural newspapers.
Outline of Study
The remainder of this study follows the general outline below.
Chapter II reviews the past research dealing with the news coverage of the
Vietnam War, the post-Vietnam U.S. military involvements, and the Persian Gulf War.
Also included is a brief review of the studies dealing with Agenda Setting theory and
Framing theory.
Chapter III provides an explanation of the methodology used in this study.
Chapter IV presents the research findings and discusses the results in detail.
Chapter V summarizes the study, offers conclusions and recommends further
research in areas related to this study.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
Since the American Revolution, the United States press and military have shared
a constantly evolving, often adversarial relationship. During the Revolutionary War, the
military paid little attention to the content of news reports regarding its activities. With
the development of the telegraph in the 1850s, though, the Civil War was the first
example in U.S. history of systemized government-sanctioned censorship of the press
during wartime (Gannett, 1991). Censorship policies by the government in later U.S.
conflicts mostly followed the same pattern: as news gathering and reporting technologies
evolved, so did the government's policies ofinformation filtering and restriction. In
VietlUlIIl, though, the press was given much more freedom to report than ever before.
Regardless ofwhether the media, or the government and military were "to blame" in the
decrease of public support in Vietnam, the tensions that developed between the two
parties directly resulted in radical changes in the way the press was aUowed to cover later
conflicts.
Following Vietnam, the military immediately began making preparations for
dealing with the press in future conflicts. Because many military leaders believed that
the conduct of the Vietnam War was impaired by negative media coverage, there was a
10
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concentrated effort to create effective guidelines for the press in future wars. Sessions
were held at the Pentagon, along with the war and naval colleges, on how to effectively
"handle" the media in future conflicts (Gannett, 1991). In other words, fostering positive
public opinion during future conflicts was nearly as high a priority as effective military
strategy. The press, on the other hand, seemed caught off guard in the conflicts foUowing
Vietnam
This thesis will apply Agenda-Setting theory, and Framing theory to the questions
surrounding the differences and similarities of news coverage of U.S. military
involvement in Vietnam and Desert Storm.
Agenda Setting Theory
According to McCombs and Shaw (1972), the mass media plays an important role
in shaping the public's perceptions of reality. Through the press, readers and viewers not
only learn about a particular issue, but also how important that particular issue is based
on the amount ofattention given to that topic by the press (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). In
their study ofthe 1968 presidential campaign, McCombs and Shaw (1972) hypothesized
that "the mass media set the agenda for each political campaign, influencing the salience
ofattitudes toward the political issues (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). In other words, the
media set the agenda for the public regarding the campaigns, telling them what was
newsworthy, and, therefore, most important. The results of their study included the
introduction ofa new media theory that illustrated the power ofthe mass media in
shaping the beliefs of many people regarding popular issues: Agenda Setting theory.
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In a follow-up study to the original study of the 1968 presidential campaigns
conducted by McCombs and Shaw, McCombs and Martin (1992) used poll and content
analysis data to compare agenda agreement and media use for particular reference
groups: men vs. women, non-whites vs. whites, young vs. old, higher vs. lower-formally
educated and rich vs. poor.
The results of the study showed correlations among similar groups when
newspaper readership, along with television viewing time, was high (McCombs &
Martin, 1992). The study concludes that a major function ofmass media is to enhance
group consensus among otherwise diverse social groups, by providing issue agenda
options that are more attractive than issues that are more specific to a person's race, age,
level of education, or financial status (McCombs & Martin, 1992). More simply put, the
media can reach larger, more diverse audiences by providing "agenda options" that reach
more diverse levels of the social system.
Iyengar and Simon (1994) examined the role of the military and media in agenda-
setting during the Gulf War. They found that as coverage of the war increased, its
perceived importance by the public also increased. Most other major issues were
displaced from the public agenda to allow for greater war coverage.
Agenda Setting theory can be applied to the question ofwhether differences exist
in the types ofnews coverage that occurred during Vietnam compared to the Persian Gulf
Conflict. Because mass media coverage was the only way most Americans received
infonnation about both conflicts, the media played an important role in shaping public
opinion during both wars. In other words, the press mostly set the agenda of infonnation
presented to the American public during both conflicts. This study is important because
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it examines where the media obtained the information presented to the public. In other
words, censorship ofnews ultimately resuhs in the military and government setting the
agenda for the press, who in turn sets the agenda for what information is presented to the
public.
Framing Theory
Framing theory was developed as a further dimension ofAgenda Setting theory.
Framing essentially involves salience and selection. Frames call attention to some
aspects ofreality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have
different reactions. While Agenda Setting theory deals with the transmission of issues
from the media to the public, framing theory looks at how the media can alter the public's
perceptions ofthe meanings of particular issues being reported on.
Gitlin (1980) introduced the concept of "framing" as it relates to mass media in
his study of how the press reported on a major political movement among students in the
1960s. The study found that the news coverage of a social movement or event can shape
public opinion about that particular issue though a variety of framing strategies.
Entrnan (1993) defines the concept of framing by the media as essentially
involving salience and selection. According to Entman, "frames call attention to some
aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have
different reactions."
Many researchers have found further evidence of framing in media content while
studying agenda-setting. Weaver et aI. (1981) examined the images that voters held of
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presidential candidates during the 1976 presidential campaign. In their study, they found
a high degree ofcorrespondence between the agenda of attributes most commonly
portrayed in the news media and the attributes most important in voters~ minds.
Much like agenda-setting theory~ the concept of framing is relevant to the
question ofhow both Vietnam and Desert Storm were covered by the media.
Vietnam
Much has been written about the possible effects of the media coverage of the
U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. A divide exists, however, among those who
believe that negative media coverage of the Vietnam war contributed to the eventual
failure ofthe government's policies, and those who believe that the press only told what
was really happening, eventually exposing the mistakes and misleading acts of the
government and military. A consensus seems to exist among all studies, however, that
the relationship between the press and the military in Vietnam, along with the news
coverage that resulted, had a great impact, both positively and negatively, on the
government's policies in Vietnam (Tallman & McKerns~ 2000). The tensions between
the press and military in Vietnam were important in determining not only the outcome of
that conflict, but in shaping the way news was collected and reported in later U.S.
military invoIvements.
In 1971, Russo conducted a study ofthe possible bias in the television coverage
ofthe Vietnam war from 1969 to 1970. Five students, each with differing political
viewpoints, were given a series ofquestions regarding the nightly newscasts ofNBC and
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CBS from 1969 to 1970. These two networks were chosen because they had drawn over
80 percent of television viewers for that type ofshow for the years being studied. A
stratified random sample of two broadcasts per month was eventually chosen for analysis,
making 48 broadcasts per network, or a total of 98. The results of the study showed no
bias against the Nixon Administration's policies in Vietnam in the 1969 and 1970
broadcasts ofeither network (Russo, 1971).
Another study conducted by Patterson (1984) involved the content analysis of
three publications: Time, Life, and Newsweek Each publication was studied in order to
determine whether the Vietnam war was the dominant topic from August 5, 1968 to
August 15, 1973. A representative sample was obtained by using a table of random
numbers to establish the publication dates to be sampled. The sample analyzed included
55 issues of Time, 55 issues of Newsweek and 50 issues ofLife. For each issue, 48 major
topic categories were established for the coding ofall stories. The topic "Vietnam" was
one of the 48 topic categories. For stories that qualified under the topic "Vietnam," each
was analyzed to determine if they dealt with combat or non-combat, and whether they
dealt with the anti-war movement or not. Stories were also divided among those with
pictures, and those without pictures. For those with pictures, each was coded as showing
dead or not showing dead, and showing wounded or not.
The analysis of the stratified random sample of 160 news magazine issues
provided 6871 individual stories for study. Of those, 436 or 6.4 percent were classified
as Vietnam-related. The author concluded that the specific topic "Vietnam" received
near proportional coverage compared to the other 47 possible topics. While this study
shows that the Vietnam war did not dominate the content of the magazines studied, it also
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does not account for the reported negative shift in public opinion toward the war. This
study shows that the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam was not the dominant topic of
news magazines during the time studied.
A study by Sherer (1989) performed content analysis on Vietnam war photos that
appeared in three publications: Time. Life and Newsweek 286 photographs were chosen
for the study, and each was assigned to one offour major groups, each with more specific
sub-groups:
1) Scene: the moment captured in the photograph was coded as: (a) an actual
combat situation with troops under fire and/or military equipment in action,
(b) a combat related situation in an area ofpotential combat but not actually
under fire, or (c) a non-combat situation in an area ofrelative safety such as
headquarters, cities, or other locations.
2) Subject: The primary subject of the photograph was coded as being either: (a)
Americans, (b) allies, (c) enemies, or (d) weapons/equipment.
3) Portrayal: The way in which the primary subject was portrayed was coded as
(a) in an immediate life threatening situation, (b) in a situation ofdiscomfort
or fatigue related to a combat experience but not an immediate life threatening
situation, (c) a situation of relative safety without a sense of combat related
discomfort or fatigue, (d) weapons, equipment, or military targets in a state of
destruction, or (e) weapons, equipment, or military targets not in a state of
destruction.
4) Perspective: the way in which the photograph captured the situation was coded
as: (a) close-up view with emphasis on small numbers of people or objects
shown in tightly cropped photographs, (b) normal view with emphasis on full
body shots or oQjects viewed in their entirety, (c) distant views where
backgrounds are higWy visible and people or objects occupy relatively small
parts of the entire image (Sherer, 1989).
The photographs used in the study were placed into one of three time groups:
Group one included photographs that were published during the time period when public
opinion toward the war was favorable, from January 1965 to July 1967; Group two
included photographs from a "transition" period, when public support for the war was
divided, in October and December of 1967; Group three included photographs from the
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time period when public support for the war was limited, from February 1968 to January
1973.
The results of Sherer's study showed that of the photographs published during the
time period when public support for the war was relatively high, the majority of photos
from all three magazines were non-combat photos. During the second time group, when
public support for the war was divided, a greater percentage ofcombat and combat-
related photos was published. For the time period when public opinion of the war was
low, the representative photographs tended to be equally combat and combat-related
versus non-combat related, much the same as the period when public support for the war
was at its highest (Sherer, 1989).
In addition to different percentages of particular types ofscenes being depicted
during the different time periods, Sherer's study also showed that the magazines studied
tended to use different subjects in their photos as the war progressed. During the time
period when public support for the war was at its highest, the magazines mostly showed
images ofAmerican forces and military weapons and equipment (Sherer, 1989).
During the transition period ofpublic support for the war, photographs of American
forces were the main subjects in the photographs ofall three publications. Once the
public became mostly opposed to the war, though, most ofthe photographs focused more
on allied forces, and less on American forces and equipment.
Sherer concludes in his study that as public opinion ofthe Vietnam war shifted
over time, so did the images of the magazines studied. When public support for the war
was at its highest, the images in the magazines mostly showed American forces and
military equipment in combat and non-combat related situations, with very few actual
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combat situations shown (Sherer, 1989). When public support for the war was nearly
divided, the images changed from mostly non-combat related to mostly combat and
combat related situations. The images from the time period when public support for the
war was at its lowest included mostly images were of combat and combat related
situations.
A study by Miller (1995) examines the question ofwhether the media lost the war
in Vietnam, along with the implications ofthis idea in later news coverage. This study
emphasizes the importance of the notion ofrnany that the media was mostly to blarne for
the failures ofVietnam. The author states that the idea of the press as the cause of the
U.S. military failure in Vietnam is primarily responsible for detennining how subsequent
U.S. military involvements have been covered by the media (Miller, 1995).
This study involved in-depth interviews with military and media representatives,
along with a qualitative analysis of literature dealing with media and military relations.
The study concludes that the evolution of restrictions imposed by the military onto the
media has negatively affected the mainstream media's capacity to provide effective
checks and balances on government and military activities (Miller, 1995).
A study by Louis Camponmenosi (1994) examines the New York Times editorial
coverage ofthe U.S. involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1965, and examines whether
or not the U.S. press should be considered an "oppositional press."
The study focused on the editorial position of the newspaper when government
decisions on whether to escalate the U.S. military involvement in the war were being
made (Campomenos~ 1994). The study states that the New York Times recommended to
President Kennedy that the U.S. should seek negotiations and neutralization, thereby
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limiting the U.S. commitment in the conflict. This study concludes that after President
Johnson took office, the Times began to display characteristics ofan oppositional press,
questioning Johnson's Vietnam policies.
Flowers (1996) conducted a content analysis of photographs dealing with the u.s.
military involvement in Vietnam that appeared in Life magazine from 1962 to 1972.
During that time, the magazine published over 1200 photographs that dealt with the U.S.
military presence in Vietnam, with nearly 600 photographs published that dealt with the
war on the "homefront" (Flowers, 1996).
The study analyzes the general tone, characteristics, and trends of Life's coverage
of the war, the homefront, and the antiwar movement (Flowers, 1996). All photographs
that were published between 1962 and 1972 in the magazine were analyzed in this study.
Content analysis shows that Life published. a mixture ofphotographs that can be
classified as "positive," "neutral," or "negative" based on the degree to which they
supported U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. Flowers concludes that L~le presented a
positive view ofthe war until 1969, nearly a year after the Tet Offensive. After 1969, the
photographs analyzed. showed a steady increase in negativity (Flowers, 1996).
Francis Faulkner's study of the American News Media in Vietnam from 1960 to
1975 provides a chronological examination of the problems encountered by the press in
Vietnam, along with the reasons for the increasing tensions between the military and
media during that time. According to Faulkner, the press that was sent to cover the war
was not well educated in either the history ofVietnam, or military tactics. As a result,
most ofthe news reports were superficial, and mostly followed. the general information
provided by military reports. Faulkner also states that there was a general failure ofthe
t
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professional journalistic organizations in the U.S. to support reporters in Vietnam in
holding the government accountable for its actions (Faulkner, 1981).
Post Vietnam
The reporters who sought to cover the U.S. military actions following the
withdrawal from Vietnam encountered levels ofcensorship and restrictions never before
experienced. After the tensions experienced between the press and military in Vietnam,
the military sought to limit press access in later involvements as a means to more
effectively control public opinion (Baroody, 1998). As a result, most of the news
coverage of U.S. military involvements between the end of Vietnam and the beginning of
Desert storm was strictly controlled by the government.
Mennin (1996) examined the impact ofpolitics on the news coverage of military
interventions in Vietnam, Grenada, Libya, Panama, the Persian GuLf, Somalia, and Haiti.
According to this study, there is a direct correlation between conflicts in Washington DC
and critical viewpoints in political news reports. According to Mermin, when there is
conflict in Washington, critical viewpoints are more frequent in the news (Mermin,
1996). On the other hand, ifthere is bipartisan consensus in the government, little critical
analysis ofgovernment policies is reported. According to Mennin:
The evidence shows that journalists could have found ample critical viewpoints to
report in the Washington consensus cases, if they had consulted foreign policy
experts operating outside of Washington, and citizens in some way mobilized to
influence foreign policy. In reporting the news inside the terms and boundaries of
debate in Washington, the media enable a Washington consensus to dominate
foreign policy debate in the public sphere, instead of reporting the news from a
vantage point independent ofgovernment as the First Amendment holds
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(Mermin, 1996).
The cases examined in this study were U.S. intervention in Grenada, Libya,
Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti. The news media used. in this study were
the New York Times, ABC World News Tonight, and the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour
(Merrnin, 1996).
This study is limited because it does not address the evolving military guidelines
restricting press access during the post-Vietnam U.S. military conflicts.
A 1996 study by Trevor ThraU looks at war in the "media age," along with the
conflicts between the government and press in Vietnam, the Persian Gulf war, the
invasion ofGrenada, and the invasion ofPanama.
According to this study, the increasing importance of the media in U.S. politics
has changed the way in which the U.S. wages war, and, particularly, the way in which the
government deals with the press during war. The study examines the rise in the
government's use ofpress restrictions and public relations since Vietnam as essential
elements ofAmerica's "new way of war" (Thrall, 1996).
Thrall uses four case studies: the Vietnam war, the invasion of Grenada, the
invasion ofPanarna, and the Persian Gulfwar, to show the government's efforts to foster
positive public support for military actions using the media as a public relations tool
(Thrall, 1996).
The results of this study show that following Vietnam, the government and
military began to reevaluate how they should deal with the media during times of war.
The evolution of press restrictions from Vietnam to Desert Storm shows that the military
realized, through various degrees of press restriction in brief conflicts such as Panama
22
and Grenada, that the media could ultimately be used as a public relations tool to foster
support from the U.S. public during times ofmilitary conflict (Thrall, 1996).
Thrall's research is relevant the current study because it illustrates the changes in
the Government's employment ofpress restrictions following Vietnam. However,
because the study is qualitative in nature, it leaves a need for direct comparison of news
stories dealing with different military conflicts using quantitative methods. A
quantitative content analysis of the news stories dealing with the relevant conflicts will
lend further significance to the effects of the military's guidelines dealing with the press.
Fox (1995) looks at the evolution of press guidelines for coverage of U.S.
conflicts following Vietnam. According to this study, the military guidelines restricting
the press are an example of sociologist William F. Ogburn's theory ofcultural lag.
Cultural lag is: "when one oftwo parts ofa culture which are correlated change before or
in greater degree than the other part does, thereby causing less adjustment between the
two parts than existed previously" (Fox, 1995).
According to Fox, advances in newsgathering technology constitute the
independent variable which causes the change in the lagging culture: media/military
guidelines (Fox, 1995). This study demonstrates that the revisions in the guidelines for
the coverage of U.S. forces in combat are driven by technological advances in
newsgathering and reporting techniques. Most significantly, the use of communication
satellites by news agencies in the Persian Gulf War induced the 1992 revision of press
guidelines in wartime, since the previous coverage guidelines did not envision that
capability (Fox, 1995).
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This study concluded by stating that information management in the Gulf War by
the military inspired the media to later seek new standards for coverage guidelines during
U.S. military conflict. The author criticizes the coverage guidelines for the media during
times ofconflict because they deal only with existing technology, and do not take into
account future technological advancements (Fox, 1995).
A study by Hiromi Otsuki (1995) looks at the role of the media in American
foreign policy from 1980 to 1994. The author states that increasingly, government
policy-makers are taking into account the potential impact ofthe media on U.S. foreign
policy (Otsuki, 1995).
According to this study, one ofthe top priorities for the government in times of
foreign policy crisis is to secure and maintain public support. Since most American
citizens obtain infonnation about current events from the media, the government handles
the media carefully. This study points out two events of the last two decades that have
seemingly brought government and press relations to a new phase: the invasion of
Grenada, and the Persian Gulf War. During those crises, the media acted mostly as
"cheerleaders" ofthe government largely because oftheir uncritical and passive coverage
ofevents (Otsuk~ 1995).
In a study by Shannon Crabtree (1995), the guidelines for journalists in past
military conflicts are examined, along with proposals for guidelines for future conflicts.
According to this study, the debate over what rules journalists should be required to
follow while covering a military conflict began after Vietnam, when the media was
blamed by the military for significantly contributing to its lack of success in Vietnam
(Crabtree, 1995).
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The author states that after Vietnam, media access to combat zones went from
complete exclusion to limited access (Crabtree, 1995). The study examines in-depth the
evolution of the guidelines journalists have followed since Vietnam. The author also
proposes guidelines for future conflicts (Crabtree, 1995).
Although this study looks at the military's guidelines dealing with the press
during times ofU.S. military conflict, it does not involve a quantitative analysis of news
stories dealing those conflicts.
The Persian Gulf Conflict
As Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 1990, a new era of U.S. military and press
relations began. Since the withdrawal from Vietnam, the military had been preparing for
the next major conflict not only in military strategy, but also in dealing with the press.
By the time the crisis in the Persian Gulfbegan, the military already had in place intricate
guidelines and rules to control press access to restricted information and combat zones.
Morlan (1992) examines the news coverage of the Persian Gulf conflict as
reported in the New York Times, using a content analysis of sample issues.
The content analysis examined the use of sources before, during, and after the Persian
Gulf crisis to determine whether the media's reliance on Bush administration officials
increased during three successive periods: (l) February 1 to August 1, 1990; (2) August
2, 1990 to January 16, 1991; and (3) January 17 to March 14, 1991. The study also
examined descriptions of allied and Iraqi officials and whether editorial and opinion
pieces reflected administration policy on the use ofmilitary force (Morlan, 1992).
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The results ofthe study showed that the newspaper used government
administration sources significantly more often during Desert Storm than during Desert
Shield (Morl~ 1992). The newspaper's descriptions of Saddam Hussein also increased
significantly once the war began. Also, negative descriptions ofSaddam Hussein
significantly increased after Iraq's invasion ofKuwait (Morlan, 1992).
A study by John Newhagen (1994) examines the relationship between censorship
and the emotional and critical tone oftelevision news coverage of the Persian Gulf War.
The study was conducted using a content analysis of television war news coverage of the
Persian Gulffrom January 31,1991, to March 3, 1991. The unit of analysis for the study
was story topic, which consisted ofsounds and pictures dealing with one event
(Newhagen, 1994). A total of424 stories of"breaking news," especially those showing
combat and its effects, were used in this study.
The results of the study show that overall, stories with Iraqi sources were more
negative, more intense, and more critical than stories with U.S. sources, regardless of the
presence or absence of censorship disclaimers (Newhagen, 1994).
A study by Griffin and Lee (1995) examined photographs of the Persian Gulf War
that appeared in Time, Newsweek, and Us. News & World Report. A total of 1,104 Gulf
War-related photographs were examined that appeared in the selected publications
between January 21, 1991, and March 18, 1991. The photographs were divided into the
following 12 major categories for analysis, then divided again into 24 "low-frequency,"
categories.
According to the authors, the three most numerous genres of pictures were: (l)
pictures of military hardware; (2) noncombatant scenes of troops; and (3) photos of
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political leaders. These categories of pictures comprised more than halfof the 1,104
pictures used in the study (Griffin & Lee, 1995).
The authors conclude by stating that in the case of the Persian Gulf War, the
newsmagazines seemed to emphasize military technology and hardware at the expense of
the "hwnan side of war" (Griffin & Lee, 1995).
Summary
Much has been written concerning the news media's role in covering both the
Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War. The majority of studies dealing with both
conflicts are qualitative, and usually support either the military or media, while often
blaming the other party for perceived failures in each war. There are significantly fewer
studies, however, that compare the content ofnews stories ofeither war using
quantitative methods, specifically content analysis.
Ofthose studies that involve content analysis of media content, most examine
television news coverage. Because of its wider audience, studies dealing with the content
of television news can be generalized to a much wider audience than studies concerning
print media.
The studies that examine the content ofprint media look mostly at news stories
from a particular conflict; others examine photographs associated with a particular
conflict.
Ofthe studies reviewed, none involved a direct comparison ofprint news stories
from each conflict using content analysis. A quantitative content analysis directly
-comparing news stories from Vietnam and Desert Storm is needed to help illustrate the
effects of evolving war coverage guidelines on print news content.
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-CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
This thesis uses a content analysis to examine selected news stories in The New
York Times, The Washington Post, and The Los Angeles Times. The basis for the coding
procedures and definitions is borrowed from Rodgers' study of the coverage of the 1992
Presidential campaign by Newsweek, People, Time, and Us. News and World Report.
Research Questions
The previous chapters have outlined the evolution of the relations between the
U.S. military and media from Vietnam to the Persian Gulfcontlict. The viewpoint of
both the military and press have been addressed, along with examples of tensions that
sometimes resulted from differing beliefs regarding news coverage of military conflicts.
This study will attempt to determine the effects of the military's evolving
guidelines regarding media coverage ofU.S. military conflicts from Vietnam to Desert
Storm on the content of the resulting news reports. Specifically, the sources ofstories
will be examined.
This thesis will address the following research questions:
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1. Do news articles dealing with the Vietnam War rely more or less on official
government and military sources than stories dealing with later U.S. military conflicts?
2. Do news articles dealing with the U.S. military conflict in Grenada rely more
or less on official government and military sources than stories dealing with the Vietnam
War?
3. Do news articles dealing with the Persian Gulf War rely more or less on
official government and military sources than stories dealing with the Vietnam War?
Selection of the Media Chosen for Analysis
This thesis analyzes three newspapers: The New York Times, The Los Angeles
Times and The Washington Post. All the selected newspapers are large, urban-based
daily newspapers. All three newspapers have circulations of more than two million,
including Sunday editions. The 2000 daily circulation figures for the selected
newspapers were: The New York Times, 2,436,436; The Los Angeles Times, 1,111,785;
The Washington Post, 783,000. These newspapers were selected for this study because
unlike smaller, local newspapers, which rely heavily on the Associated Press for stories
dealing with international issues, these newspapers almost always had reporters on the
scene.
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Sampling Plan
In order to study the news coverage ofVietnam, Grenad~ and the Persian Gulf
War, the three conflicts were first divided into five separate time periods for study.
The Vietnam War was divided into two separate time periods: 1964-1968, and
1969-1973. According to Dr. Joseph Stout, professor of history at Oklahoma State
University, the first time period, 1964-1968, represents a time when U.S. intervention in
Vietnam was generally supported by the U.S. public. The second time period, on the
other hand, involved less public support for the war, and included the eventual
withdrawal of most U.S. troops from Vietnam.
Because the U.S. military invasion of Grenada took place over such a short period
of time, the news coverage ofthe conflict used in this study involves only a three-month
period: October, 1983-December, 1983.
The final two time periods are Desert Shield: August, 1990-December, 1990; and
Desert Stonn: January, 1991-March, 1991.
For each year included in this study, random sampling was used to determine the
issues to be analyzed. For each ofthe 12 years studied (Desert Shield and Desert Storm
are counted as one year) 14 issues were randomly selected, with the exception of 1966,
which included 10 issues studied. The sample size for this study was based on Guido
Stemple's 1952 study. The results of Stemple's study indicate that for content analysis of
newspapers, a sample size of five issues for a year would be adequate, and that increasing
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the sample size beyond 12 issues for a year does not produce significant differences in
the results (Stemple, 1952).
The Web site www.researchrandomizer.org was used to generate a set of random
numbers for selecting the issues to be studied. Using the random numbers generated, the
following issues of the three newspapers were selected.
-TABLE I
RANDOMLY SELECTED SAMPLE FOR EACH YEAR STIJDIED
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1964
Thursday, Feb 6
Monday, March 2
Sunday, March 29
Thursday, April 2
Friday, June 12
Saturday, June 20
Saturday, August 1
Thursday, August 13
Saturday, August 15
Tuesday, September 29
Monday, October 26
Tuesday, November 3
Friday, November 13
Wednesday, November 25
1966
Friday, February 25
Thursday, March 3
Wednesday, April 6
Sunday, April 10
Wednesday, May 4
Monday, July 4
Tuesday, September 6
Sunday, November 20
Wednesday, December 7
Wednesday, December 28
1965
Wednesday, January 13
Wednesday, January 27
Tuesday, March 16
Monday, April 5
Sunday, May 30
Wednesday, August 4
Tuesday, August 17
Saturday, September 18
Wednesday, September 29
Monday, October 4
Monday, October 18
Thursday, November 4
Monday, November 15
Wednesday. November 24
1967
Sunday, January 1
Sunday, January 8
Monday, March 6
Saturday, March 18
Friday, March 24
Monday, April 10
Friday, May 19
Friday, June 9
Saturday, July 1
Sunday, July 30
Friday, October 20
Sunday, October 22
Monday, November 20
Friday, December 22
-1968
Sunday, April 7
Thursday, April II
Tuesday, April 30
Monday, May 13
Tuesday, July 9
Thursday, August 22
Friday, September 6
Thursday, September 26
Sunday, September 29
Monday, October 21
Wednesday, October 30
Thursday, October 31
Tuesday, November 5
Tuesday, November 26
1970
Saturday, March 28
Sunday, March 29
Thursday, May 14
Tuesday, July 7
Saturday, July 11
Friday, July 24
Tuesday, August II
Monday, August 24
Thursday, September 24
Tuesday, October 27
Wednesday, November II
Tuesday, November 17
Tuesday, December I
Tuesday. December 22
TABLE I (Continued)
1969
Friday, January 10
Tuesday, January 28
Saturday, February 15
Monday, March 3
Monday, April 21
Thursday, May I
Tuesday, May 27
Friday, July II
Friday, July 18
Monday, July 21
Tuesday, September 16
Sunday, October 19
Thursday, November 20
Wednesday, December 10
1971
Friday, January 29
Friday, February 19
Monday, March 1
Sunday, April 4
Tuesday, April 6
Sunday, May 16
Tuesday, June 15
Monday June 28
Sunday, July II
Saturday, July 24
Wednesday, Augu t II
Tuesday, August 17
Monday, August 23
Thursday, October 7
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1972
Thursday, February 10
Wednesday, February 16
Thursday, March 23
Saturday, April 22
Saturday, June 10
Tuesday, July 18
Friday, September 1
Thursday, September 28
Tuesday, October 3
Thursday, October 5
Friday, October 6
Sunday, October 8
Wednesday, November I
Monday, December 11
1983
Monday, October 3
Tuesday, October 4
Wednesday, October 5
Thursday, October 13
Saturday, October 15
Thursday, October 27
Monday, October 3]
Thursday, November 4
Thursday, November 10
Friday, November 18
Monday, November 28
Tuesday, December 20
Saturday, December 24
Friday, December 30
1991
Thursday, January 10
Saturday, February 2
Wednesday, February 6
Tuesday, February 12
Saturday, February 16
Sunday, February 24
Tuesday, March 19
TABLE I (Continued)
1973
Wednesday, January 24
Saturday, February 24
Wednesday, February 28
Wednesday, March 7
Wednesday, March 28
Saturday, May 19
Thursday, June 14
Friday, June 15
Tuesday, July 31
Monday, August 13
Tuesday, August 28
Wednesday, September 5
Saturday, September 8
Sunday, November 11
1990
Tuesday, August 28
Saturday, October 6
Thursday, November 1
Tuesday, November 13
Friday, November ]6
Tuesday, December 4
Thursday, December 6
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Unit ofAnalysis
The unit ofanalysis in this study is each news story. For each newspaper, news
briefs are considered individual stories. The study will not include paid advertisements,
opinion columns, editorial cartoons, letters to the editor, graphics, photographs, captions
or copy on the front page that merely previews a full story printed later in the issue
(Rodgers, 1993).
Coding Procedures and Definitions
Each unit included in this study was coded for the following variables:
publication, topic, source, and length.
The publication category refers to each newspaper selected for this study. Topic
is what each story is about. The source category is important for this study to determine
whether military conflicts with more press restrictions had more stories with "official"
government or military sources. In order to determine the source ofeach news article,
the beginning paragraphs were read to determine who the source might be. Also, several
key phrases were looked for in deciding ifa story had "official" sources. Some of the
most frequent "key" phrases were: "According to official U.S. sources"; "According to
U.S. military spokesmen"; "According to government sources"; and "According U.S.
officials".
For this study, 36 topic categories were used.
The topic categories are:
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1. US. Military Strategy.
2. U.S. military statistics. Equipment, troop movements, etc.
3. Ally military statistics.
4. Other military statistics.
5. U.S. and Ally military technology. Focused on the capabilities or
development of U.S. and Ally military machinery or weapons.
6. Other Military Technology.
7. Peace Talks.
8. Criticism of Peace Talks.
9. U.S. Political. Focused on the words, actions or opinions ofU.S. politicians.
10. Ally Political.
11. Other Political.
12. Economy. Focused on the effects of military conflict on a nation's economy.
13. U.S. Public.
14. U.S. Military Victories.
15. Ally Military Victories.
16. U.S. Military Defeats, or deaths.
17. Ally Military Defeats, or deaths.
18. Military Human Interest.
19. Civilian Human Interest. Focused on civilians who are present or near to
fighting.
20. Enemy attacks on U.S. or Ally.
21. U.S. military attack.
TJ All mili' k__. y tary attac .
23. Alleged war crimes.
24. U.S. non-military aid to civilians.
25. Warnings of U.S. military attacks.
26. War Protest (U.S.).
27. War Protest (Ally).
28. War Protest (Other).
29. Criticism ofU.S. policy.
30. Support of U.S. policy.
31. Criticism of Ally policy.
32. Criticism of Draft.
33. Support of Draft.
34. Support of Defense Spending.
35. Criticism of Defense Spending.
36. Criticism of Media Censorship.
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Each story used in this study was also coded to determine its source. The source
is an important element of the stories coded because it shows where journalists obtained
their information. A high number of stories from official government and military
sources might be the result ofmore government and military control of information, or a
tendency ofjournalists to rely on the government and military for information.
The following 15 source categories were developed for this study:
1. Official Military (U.S.). Information obtained from public affairs officers or
other military spokespeople who are authorized to provide such information.
-2. Unofficial Military (U.S.). Information obtained from U.S. military personnel
who are not considered official spokespersons by the military.
3. Official Military (Other). Infonnation obtained from military personnel of
opposing forces who are official spokespersons.
4. Unofficial Military (Other). Information obtained from military personnel of
opposing forces who are not official spokespersons.
5. Official Military (Ally). Infonnation obtained from military personnel of
nations who are allies of the United States. They are official spokespersons of their
military.
6. Unofficial Military (Ally). Information obtained from military personnel of
nations who are allies of the United States. These are military sources who are not
considered official spokespersons by their military.
7. U.S. Civilian. U.S. citizens not employed by the military or government.
8. Allied Civilian. Information obtained from citizens of Allied nations who are
not employed by their military or government.
9. Other Civilian. Information obtained from civilian citizens ofnations at war
with the United States.
10. U.S. Government Non-Military. Information obtained from government
officials who are not members of the military. (Secretary of State, President, etc.).
11. Allied Government Non-Military. Information obtained from Allied
government officials who are not members of their military.
12. Other Government Non-Military. Infonnation obtained from government
officials ofnations at war with the United States.
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13. United Nations. Information obtained from United Nations officials.
14. Other Neutral International Group. Infonnation obtained from non-
government sponsored groups like The Red Cross.
15. Un-attributed. The source of information in a news story is not cited.
Each story used in this study was coded for length in square inches. Unlike the
"colwnn inches" method of measurement, this type ofmeasurement makes adjustments
for variations in column width (Rodgers, 1993). The stories were measured from the top
ofthe story to the bottom of the last line on the page. Ifnecessary, measurements were
rounded up to the nearest inch. The rounding ofmeasurements was used to simplify the
coding procedure. After measuring each unit of copy, the dimensions were figured to
obtain the total story length in square inches.
Statistical Analysis
This study will use Chi Square as a statistical test. The chi square test is used to
determine if the obtained results of research differed significantly from those expected.
The chi square test measures the deviation ofobtained results compared with those
expected to determine the probability that the results could have occurred due to chance.
-CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF DATA
Intercoder Reliability
The author was the only coder for this study; because the coding categories are
not subjective, a single coder does not affect the validity of this study's results. However,
to better ensure that the findings are accurate, a test for intercoder reliability was
performed approximately one month after the initial coding. A random sample of 15
issues was selected from the 164 issues used in this study. For each newspaper used in
the study, five issues were tested. For each coding category, reliability was assessed at
greater than .91, indicating that the initial coding was accurate and reliable. The overall
reliability score for all issues in this test was .96.
Findings
This study involved the coding of relevant stories in the three newspapers over a
total of 12 years (Vietnarn=lO years; Grenada=l year; The Persian GulfWar=1 year).
For each year, a random sample of 14 issues was examined. The year 1964 was the only
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exception; 10 issues were randomly selected. For each newspaper, 164 total issues were
examined.
Table II presents the total number of articles examined over the 12 years for each
newspaper. Table III shows the total number ofarticles for each of the five time periods
studied (Vietnam, 1964-1968; Vietnam, 1969-1973; Grenada; Desert Shield; and Desert
Storm).
TOTAL NUMBERS OF ARTICLES EXAMINED FOR EACH NEWSPAPER
TOTAL NUMBERS OF ARTICLES EXAMINED FOR EACH CONFLICT
TABLE II
1624
Total
487 (30%)
Washington Post
543 (33.4%)
TABLE III
Los Angeles Times
594 (36.6%)
New York Times
No. of
Articles
Time Period Frequency Percent
Viet~ 1964-1968 594 36.6
Vietnam, 1969-1973 492 30.3
Grenada 72 4.4
Desert Shield 192 11.8
Desert Storm 274 16.9
Total 1624 100%
Table IV shows the frequency with which each topic occurred among the 1624
articles examined.
TABLE IV
FREQUENCIES OF EACH TOPIC AMONG THE ARTICLES EXAMINED
Topic Frequency Percent
U.S. Military Statistics 30 1.8
U.S. Military Strategy 137 8.4
Ally Military Statistics 30 1.8
Other Military Statistics 59 3.6
U.S./Ally Military Technology 52 3.2
Peace Talks 150 9.2
Other Military Technology 10 .6
U.S. Political 28 1.7
Ally Po litical 17 1.0
Other Political 40 2.5
Economy 47 2.9
Criticism of Peace Talks 12 .7
U.S. Public 11 .7
U.S. Military Victories 50 3.1
U.S. Military DefeatslDeaths 23 1.4
Military Human Interest 114 7.0
Civilian Human Interest 61 3.8
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A chi square test conducted shows a significant difference in the occurrences of
different topics in the articles examined (chi square=1466.901, df=35, p <.001). The two
topics that occurred most frequently were ''Peace Talks" (150=9.2%), and "U.S. War
Protests" (149=9.2%).
Table V shows the frequency with which each source was used among the 1624
articles examined.
TABLE V
FREQUENCIES OF EACH SOURCH AMONG THE ARTICLES EXAMINED
Source Frequency Percent
Official Military (U.S.) 480 29.6
Unofficial U.S. Military 142 8.7
Official Military (Ally) 56 3.4
Unofficial Military (Ally) 10 .6
Official Military (Other) II .7
Civilian (U.S.) 214 13.2
Civilian (Ally) 61 3.8
Civilian (Other) 19 1.2
Foreign Government (Ally) 77 4.7
Foreign Government (Other) 81 5.0
U.S. Government (Non-Military) 383 23.6
United Nations 15 .9
Other Neutral International Group 14 .9
Un-attributed 61 3.8
Total 1624 100
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A chi square test conducted shows that the differences in the occurrences ofeach
source are significant (chi square=2402.897, df=13, p< .001). The most frequently used
source was "Official U.S. Military" (480=29.6%), followed by ''U.S. Government Non-
Military" (383=23.6%). The two other sources used significantly more than others were
"Civilian (U.S.)" (214=13.2%), and ''Unofficial U.S. Military" (142=8.7%).
Table VI shows the frequencies with which each source was used during each
time period studied.
TABLE VI
FREQUENCIES OF EACH SOURCE AMONG EACH CONFLICT
Source VI V2 G DS DST Total
Official U.S. Military ]64 134 20 73 89 480
Unofficial U.S. Military 57 51 3 5 26 142
Official Military (Ally) 8 36 I 2 9 56
Unofficial Military (Ally) 4 5 10
Official Military (Other) 4 6 ] 1
Civilian (U.S.) 79 55 ]5 29 36 2]4
Civilian (Ally) 25 28 1 7 61
Civilian (Other) 8 7 4 19
Foreign Govt. (Ally) 26 27 5 8 ] I 77
Foreign Govt. (Other) 24 25 3 13 ]6 81
U.S. Govt. Non-Military 131 107 22 55 68 383
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TABLE VI (Continued)
Source VI V2 G OS OST Total
United Nations 6 1 3 2 3 15
Other Neutral Int. Group 8 2 3 14
Un-attributed 50 8 3 61
Total 594 492 72 192 274 1624
VI=Vietnarn (1964-1968); V2=Vietnarn (1969-1973); G=Grenada; DS=Oesert
Shield; DST=Oesert Storm.
A chi square test conducted shows that the differences in the occurrences ofeach
source during each conflict are significant (chi square=l 65.059, df=52, p <.001). In each
conflict the most frequently used source was "Official Military", followed closely by
"U.S. Government Non-Military". Combined, the two source categories were used in
49.6 percent ofVietnam (1964- I968) stories; 48.9 percent of Vietnam (1969-1973)
stories; 58.3 percent of Grenada stories; 66.6 percent of Desert Shield stories; and 57.2
percent ofDesert Storm stories. Other than "Official U.S. Military" and "U.S
Government", the most frequently used source was "U.S. Civilian". The results show
that as the use of "official" sources increased, the number of stories with "U.S. Civilian
sources also increased; the time period with the highest percentage of"U.S. Civilian"
sources is Grenada (20.8%).
Table VII shows the frequencies of each source used during both Vietnam time
periods compared to the later conflicts (Grenada and the Persian Gulf War).
-
-TABLE VII
FREQUENCIES OF VIETNAM ARTICLE SOURCES COMPARED TO LATER
CONFLICTS (GRENADA AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR)
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Source GrenadalPersian Gulf War Vietnam (1964-1973) Total
Official U.S. Military 182 298 480
Unofficial U.S. Military 34 108 142
Official Military (Ally) 12 44 56
Unofficial Military (Ally) 1 9 10
Official Military (Other) 1 10 11
Civilian (U.S.) 80 114 214
Civilian (Ally) 8 53 61
Civilian (Other) 4 15 19
Foreign Govt. (Ally) 24 53 77
Foreign Govt. (Other) 32 49 81
U.S. Govt. Non-Military 145 238 383
United Nations 8 7 15
Other Neutral International Group 4 10 14
Un-attributed 3 58 61
Totals 538 1086 1624
A chi square test conducted shows that the differences in the occurrences of the
sources used during Vietnam compared! to the two later conflicts are significant (chi
square=63.446, df=13, P <.001).
-
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Table VIn shows the frequencies ofeach source used during Grenada compared
to the other conflicts.
TABLE VIII
FREQUENCIES OF GRENADA ARTICLE SOURCES COMPARED TO THOSE OF
VIETNAM AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
Source Vietnarn/Persian Gulf War Grenada Total
Official U.S. Military 460 20 480
Unofficial U.S. Military 139 3 142
Official Military (Ally) 55 1 56
Unofficial Military (Ally) to 10
Official Military (Other) 11 11
Civilian (U.S.) 199 IS 214
Civilian (Ally) 61 61
Civilian (Other) 19 19
Foreign Govt. (Ally) 72 5 77
Foreign Govt. (Other) 78 3 81
U.S. Govt. Non-Military 361 22 383
United Nations 12 3 15
Other Neutral International Group 14 14
Un-attributed 61 61
Totals 1552 72 1624
-
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A chi square test conducted shows that the differences in the occurrences of the
sources used in reports dealing with U.S. military conflict in Grenada compared to
Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War are significant (chi square=25.333, df=13, p <.05).
Table IX shows the frequencies ofeach source used during the Persian Gulf War
compared to the two earlier conflicts (Vietnam and Grenada).
TABLE IX
FREQUENCIES OF PERSIAN GULF WAR ARTICLE SOURCES COMPARED TO
THOSE OF VIETNAM AND GRENADA
Source Vietnam/Grenada Persian Gulf War Total
Official U.S. Military 318 162 480
Unofficial u.S. Military 111 31 142
Official Military (Ally) 45 11 56
Unofficial Military (Ally) {} 10
Official Military (Other) 10 ] ]
Civilian (U.S.) 149 65 214
Civilian (Ally) 53 8 61
Civilian (Other) 15 4 ]9
Foreign Govt. (Ally) 58 19 77
Foreign Govt. (Other) 52 29 81
U.S. Govt. Non-Military 260 123 383
United Nations 10 5 15
Other Neutral Int. Group 10 4 ]4
x
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Source
TABLE IX (Continued)
Vietnam/Grenada Persian Gulf War Total
Un-attributed
Totals
58
1158
3
466
61
1624
A chi square test conducted shows that the differences in the occurrences of the
sources used in reports dealing with the Persian Gulf War compared to the previous
conflicts (Vietnam and Grenada) are significant (chi square=45.165, df=13, p <.001).
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
This study used content analysis to examine randomly selected articles about
Vietnam, Grenada and The Persian Gulf War. The newspapers examined were The New
York Times, The Los Angeles Times, and The Washington Post. The purpose ofthe study
was to show if there are differences in the types ofnews stories written about each
conflict. Since each conflict involved different guidelines for reporting issued by the
govenunent and military, this study was conducted to detennine whether different
guidelines in different conflicts resulted in significantly different types of news reports.
For each article selected, each was coded for "Topic", "Source", and "Length in Square
Inches". Specifically, the use of sources was examined to show possible correlations
between the number of articles that used "official" sources (Government, Official
Military) and the time period in which the stories were written.
A random sample was selected after detennining the :five specific time periods to
be studied: Vietnam (1964-1968); Vietnam (1969-1973); Grenada (October-December,
1983); Desert Shield (August-December, 1990); and Desert Stonn (January-March,
1991). For each year, a random sample of 14 issues was examined, with the exception of
1966, which had 10. A total of 1624 individual stories were coded.
5]
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Conclusions
The findings of the content analysis conducted enable each ofthe research
questions of this study to be answered. A summary of the research questions and
findings follows:
Research Question 1: Do news articles dealing with the Vietnam War rely more
or less on official government and military sources than stories dealing with later U.S.
military conflicts (Grenada and The Persian Gulf War)?
To answer this question, the articles dealing with Vietnam were compared to
those of Grenada and The Persian Gulf War. A chi square test determined that the
sources used in the Vietnam articles are significantly different that those used in articles
dealing with Grenada and The Persian Gulf War. For Vietnam (1964-1968), 49.6 percent
of the stories analyzed had "Official U.S. Military" or "U.S. Government" sources. For
the stories dealing with Vietnam (1969-1973) the number of"official" sources decreased
slightly to 48.9 percent. However, the number of"official" sources used grew
significantly during Grenada (58.3%), Desert Shield (66.6%), and Desert Storm (57.2%).
The findings are consistent with the evolution ofthe military's guidelines for the media
regarding news coverage of U.S. military conflicts. In Vietnam, there was no official
censorship of the media by the military; as a result, there were fewer stories during
Vietnam that had "Official U.S. Military" or "U.S. Government" sources. Members of
the press did not depend as completely on the military for information about the war.
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Research Question 2: Do news articles dealing with the U.S. military conflict in
Grenada rely more or less on official government and military sources than stories
dealing with the Vietnam War?
To answer this question, the news reports dealing with Grenada were compared to
those dealing with Vietnam. A chi square test detennined that the sources used during
Grenada are significantly different than those used in stories dealing with Vietnam. 58.3
percent ofthe stories dealing with Grenada had either "Official U.S. Military" or "U.S.
Government sources, compared to 49.6 percent during Vietnam (1964-1968), and 48.9
percent during Vietnam (1969-1973). Prior to the U.S. invasion of Grenada, the military
developed guidelines and restrictions to control reporting of future conflicts. The
increase in the number of stories with "official" sources during the Grenada conflict
reflects the censorship of news coverage enacted by the military. Because the press was
completely banned from any battle zones during most of the conflict, reporters relied on
the military and government for information.
Research Question 3: Do news articles dealing with the Persian Gulf War rely
more or less on official government and military sources than stories dealing with the
Vietnam War?
To answer this question, the news articles dealing with the Persian Gulf War were
compared to those dealing with Vietnam. A chi square test showed that the differences in
the types of sources used in the two wars are significant. During Desert Shield 66.6
percent of the articles coded had "official" sources, compared to 57.2 percent during
Desert Storm. During Vietnam, only 49.6 percent of the stories from 1964-1968 had
"official" sources, compared to 48.9 percent during 1969-1973. The articles written
-54
during Desert Shield and Desert Storm had the highest percentage of stories with
"official" sources. The increase in stories with "official" sources reflects the
development of press "pools" by the military following the invasion of Grenada. The
press pools restricted information available to members of the media, resulting in a high
percentage of sources with "Official U.S. Military" and "U.S. Government" sources.
Another significant finding of this study is that as the number ofstories with
"official" sources increased, the number of stories with "U.S. Civilian" sources also
grew.
This study shows that the military's views toward media coverage during wartime
evolved between Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War, resulting in press restrictions based
on different media research "models" in the different conflicts. Models are defined as
"shorthand attempts to capture the essence ofa conceptual issue or question of interest
(Greenberg & Salwen, 1996). Before World War II, the dominant model to explain mass
media effects was the hypodennic-needle model, which involved "direct-effects" by the
media, and claimed that the media had unmitigated effects on the public. During the
1960s. the "limited-effects" model was developed by Klapper as an alternative to the
hypodennic-needle model. The limited-effects model rejects the hypodermic-needle
model and states that human perceptions are highly selective, resulting in most media
messages being ignored.
The limited-effects model seems to have been the model used during Vietnam by
the military, resulting in no press restrictions. Following Vietnam, the military
implemented media guidelines based more on the direct-effects model, especiaUy during
Grenada, where the media was considered to be powerful enough to affect public
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0pUllon. During the Persian Gulf War, the military used the "moderate-effects" model in
determining media guidelines for coverage of the conflict. Moderate-effects models
include: agenda setting, framing and gatekeeping. Moderate-effects models acknowledge
the power ofmedia messages in influencing actions and opinions, but also consider
outside factors, including politica~ social and economic influences.
Recommendations
Despite the vast amount of studies conducted on the news coverage of Vietnam
and later U.S. military conflicts, there has not been a quantitative study directly
comparing newspaper coverage of Vietnam and Desert Stonn that this researcher could
find. As a result, every effort was made to keep this study focused; and, therefore, very
limited in its scope. Unlike other studies which might "blame" either the media or
military for perceived mistakes made in reporting on U.S. wars, this study does not
expand far beyond the realm ofquantitative study. Because of its limited scope, this
study could be used as a basis tor further study on the topic of how the news media has
covered U.S. military conflicts.
One area for possible future study might be thc issue ofhow media guidelines for
war reporting were developed by the U.S. Government and military. Through interviews
and the study ofgovernment docwnents, a historical study could be conducted to show
the evolution ofthe relationship between the media and military.
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Another area for future study might be a direct comparison ofmainstream
newspaper coverage ofU.S. military conflicts with the coverage in government
publications such as Stars and Stripes.
Other areas for further study might be other types of media, including television,
magazines, and radio. A direct comparison oftelevision coverage with newspaper
coverage would be important because of television's unique ability to show a war ahnost
as it happens.
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Newspaper: _New York Times _Los Angeles Times _Washington Post
Time Period Studied: _Vietnam (1964-1968) _Vietnam (1969-1973) _Grenada
Desert Shield Desert Stonn
Topic _U.S. Military Strategy
_U.S. Military Statistics
_Ally Military Statistics
_Other Military Statistics
_U.S. and Ally Military Technology
_Peace Talks (V.S.)
_Other Military Technology
V.S. Political
_Ally Political
Other Political
_Economy
Criticism of Peace Talks
V.S. Public
Focused on U.S. Military Vi.ctories
Focused on V.S. Military Defeats, or deaths
_Military Human Interest
Civilian Human Interest
_Enemy Attacks
_Ally Defeat
_Alleged War Crimes
_Ally Attack
U.S. Non-Military Aid
__Warnings 0 f V. S. Attacks
_Ally Victory
_War Protest (U.S.)
_War Protest (Ally)
War Protest (Other)
_Criticism of U.S. Policy
_Support ofll.S. Policy
V.S. Attacks
Criticism ofDraft
_Support ofDraft
_Support of Defense Spending
_Criticism ofDefense Spending
_Criticism of Ally Policy
_Complaints about Media Censorship
Source _Official Military (D.S.)
_Unofficial Military (U.S.)
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_Official Military (Allied)
_Unofficial Military (Allied)
_Official Military (Other)
_Unofficial Military (Other)
_Civilian (American)
_Civilian (Allied)
_Civilian (Other)
_Foreign Government (Allied)
_Foreign Government (Other)
_U.S. Government Non-Military Official
United Nations
_Other Neutral International Group
Un-attributed
___Length (Square Inches)
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APPENDIXB
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD GROUNDRULES
Included in the memorandum "Ground Rules and Guidelines for Correspondents
in the Event of Hostilities in the Persian Gulf' issued to Washington Bureau Chiefs ofthe
Pentagon Press Corps by Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary ofDefense (Public Affairs).
Smith, H. (Ed.). (1992). Ground Rules and Guidelines for Desert Shield. The
Media and the Gulf War: The Press and Democracy in Wartime. Washington, DC: Seven
Locks Press.
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Operation Desert Shield Ground Rules (January, 1991)
The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast
could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:
1. For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical infonnation on troop strength,
aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery tanks, radars,
missiles, trucks, water), including amounts ofanununition or fuel moved by or on hand in
support and combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as
"company-size," "multibattalion," "multidivision," "naval task force," and "carrier battle
group." Number or amount ofequipment and supplies may be described in general terms
such as "large," "small," or "many."
2. Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes,
including postponed or canceled operations.
3. Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of
military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments.
Locations may be described as follows: all navy embark stories can identifY the ship upon
which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming from the "Persian
Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be
datelined "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti border," etc. For specific countries
outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is corning from the Persian Gulf
region unless that country has acknowledged its participation.
4. Rules of engagement details.
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5. Infonnation on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and
results.
6. During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements,
tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives.
This would include unit designations. names of operations, and size of friendly forces
involved. until released by CENTCOM.
7. Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-
based.
8. Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover,
deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.
9. Specific identif:)ring information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while
search and rescue operations are plarmed or underway.
10. Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment, or tactics.
11. Specific operating methods and tactics (e.g., air angles ofattack or speeds, or
naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General tenns such as "low" or "fast" may be
used.
12. Information on operational support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S.
forces, such as details ofmajor battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U. S.
or coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the
enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be
described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."
APPENDIX C
GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA
Included in the memorandum "Ground Rules and Guidelines for Correspondents
in the Event ofHostilities in the Persian Gulf' issued to Washington Bureau Chiefs of the
Pentagon Press Corps by Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary ofDefense (Public Affairs).
Smith, H. (Ed.). (1992). Ground Rules and Guidelines for Desert Shield. The
Media and the Gulf War: The Press and Democracy in Wartime. Washington, DC: Seven
Locks Press.
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Guidelines for News Media (January, ]99])
News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear
they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries,
cables, converters, etc.
Night Operations-Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only
approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including
flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless
specifically approved by the on-scene conunander.
Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public affairs escort
while on Saudi bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public
affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements as
determined by the host commander.
Casualty infonnation, because ofconcern of the notification ofthe next orkin, is
extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next ofkin ofall military fatalities must be
notified in person by a uniformed member ofthe appropriate service. There have been
instances in which the next of kin have first learned ofthe death or wounding ofa loved
one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media.
Casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifYing feature
or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that
sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph,
film, or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict
compliance with the instructions ofdoctors and medical officials.
..
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To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of
operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement ofhostilities,
media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S.
news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join
CENTCOM media pools, providing they agree to pool their products. News media
personnel who are not members ofthe official CENTCOM media pools will not be
permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link
up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight
security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area ofoperation aU
unauthorized individuals.
For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM media pools:
1. Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool
coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.
2. In the event of hostilities, pool products will be subject to review before release to
determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities,
operation, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopardize the
outcome ofan operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be
examined solely for its confonnace to the attached ground rules, not for its potential to
express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer on scene will
review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited
circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed
materials, immediately send the disputed materials to JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB
Director and the appropriate news media representative. If no agreement can be reached,
I"""'
the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD(PA) for review with the appropriate
bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating
reporter's news organization.
3. Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.
74
APPENDIXD
CENTCOM POOL MEMBERSHIP AND OPERATING PROCEDURES
Included in the memorandum "Ground Rules and Guidelines for Correspondents
in the Event ofHostilities in the Persian Gulf' issued to Washington Bureau Chiefs of the
Pentagon Press Corps by Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).
Smith, H. (Ed.). (1992). Ground Rilles and Guidelines for Desert Shield. The
Media and the Gulf War: The Press and Democracy in Wartime. Washington, DC: Seven
Locks Press.
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CENTCOM Pool Membership and Operating Procedures (January, 1991)
General. The following procedures pertain to the CENTCOM news media pool
concept for providing news to the widest possible American audience during the initial
stages of U.S. military activities in the Arabian Gulfarea The CENTCOM pools will be
drawn from news media within Saudi Arabia. Their composition and operation should
not be confused with that of the Department of Defense National Media Pool. The pools
are a cooperative arrangement designed to balance the media's desire for unilateral
coverage with the logistics realities of the military operation, which make it impossible
for every media representative to cover every activity ofhis or her choice, and with
CENTCOM's responsibility to maintain operational security, protect the safety ofthe
troops, and prevent interference with military operations. There is no intention to
discriminate among media representatives on the basis of reporting content or viewpoint.
Favoritism or disparate treatment of the media in pool operations by pool coordinators
will not be tolerated. The purpose and intention ofthe pool concept is to get media
representatives to and from the scene of military action, to get their reports back to the
Joint Information Bureau-Dhahran for filing-rapidly and safely, and to pennit unilateral
media coverage ofcombat and combat-related activity as soon as possible. There will be
two types ofpools: 18-member pools for ground combat operations and smaller, 7-
member pools for ground combat and other coverage. Pools will be fonned and
governed by the media organizations that are qualified to participate and will be
administered through pool-appointed coordinators working in conjunction with the JIB-
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Dhahran. The media will operate under the ground rules issued by CENTCOM on
January 15, 1991.
Pool participation. Due to logistics and space limitations, participation in the
pools will be limited to media that principally serve the American public and that have
had a long-term presence covering Department ofDefense military operations, except for
pool positions specifically designated as "Saudi" or "international." Pool positions will
be divided among the following categories of media: television, radio, wire service, news
magazine, newspaper, pencil, photo, Saudi, and international. Media that do not
principally serve the American public are qualified to participate in the CENTCOM
media pool in the international category.
Pool procedures. Because of the extensive media presence in the Arabian Gulf,
the fact that some media organizations are represented hy many individuals, and the
likelihood that more organizations and individuals will arrive in the future, membership
in all categories except pencil will be by organization rather then specific individual. An
organization will be eligible to participate in pool activities only after being a member of
the appropriate media pool category for three continuous weeks. Members ofa single-
medium pool may use their discretion to allow participation by organizations which have
had a significant stay in country, but which have had breaks in their stay that would
otherwise cause them to be ineligible to participate under the three-continuous-weeks
rule.
The single-medium pools will be formed and governed by the members. The
members ofeach category will appoint a pool coordinator who will serve as the
spokesperson and single point ofcontact for that medium. The print media will select a
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coordinator who will serve as the point of contact for the pencil category. Any disputes
about membership in or operation of the pool shall be resolved by the pool coordinator.
Each single-medium pool coordinator will maintain a current list of members and
a waiting list prioritized in the order in which they should be placed on the pools. The
same order will be used to replace pool members during normal rotations and those
individual members who return from the field prematurely and who do not have another
individual in Dhahran from their organization to replace them.
Membership of standing pools will rotate approximately every two to three weeks
as the situation pennits.
-APPENDIXE
POOL CATEGORIES AND COMPOSITION
Included in the memorandum "GroWld Rules and Guidelines for Correspondents
in the Event ofHostilities in the Persian Gulf' issued to Washington Bureau Chiefs of the
Pentagon Press Corps by Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).
Smith, H. (Ed.). (1992). Ground Rules and Guidelines for Desert Shield. The
Media and the Gulf War: The Press and Democracy in Wartime. Washington, DC: Seven
Locks Press.
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Pool Categories and Composition (January, 1991)
Television: The television category will be open to the major television networks.
Radio: The radio category will be open to shoes radio networks that serve a
general (nonprivate) listening audience.
Wire Service: The wire service category will be open to the major wire services.
News Magazine: The news magazine category will be open to those major
national news magazines that serve a general news function.
Newspaper: The newspaper category will be divided into two subcategories for
participation in the I8-member pools. One will be open to those major papers and
newspaper groups that have made a commitment since the early stages of Operation
Desert Shield to cover U.S. military activities in Saudi Arabia and which have had a
continuous or near-continuous presence in Saudi Arabia since the early stages of the
operation, such as The New York Times, Cox, Knight Ridder, The Wall Street Journal,
Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post, USA Today and Basion
Globe. The second category will in.clude all other newspapers.
Pencil: The general category of"pencil" (print reporter) may be used by the print
media pool coordinator in assigning print reporters to the smaller pools. All eligible print
reporters may participate.
Photo: The photography category will bc divided into the four subcategories of
wire, newspaper, magazine, and photo agency. Participants may take part in only one
subcategory.
Saudi: The Saudi category will be open to Saudi reporters as determined by the
Saudi Ministry ofInformation liaison in the JlB-Dhahran. They must speak and write
English and must file their reports in English.
Internatuma/: The International category will be open to reporters from
organizations which do not principally serve the American public from any news
medium. They must speak and write English and must file their reports in English.
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APPENDIX F
SHARING OF MEDIA PRODUCTS WITHIN THE CENTCOM POOLS
Included in the memorandum "Ground Rules and Guidelines for Correspondents
in the Event ofHostilities in the Persian Gulf' issued to Washington Bureau Chiefs of the
Pentagon Press Corps by Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary ofDefense (Public Affairs).
Smith, H. (Ed.). (1992). Ground Rules and Guidelines for Desert Shield. The
Media and the Gulf War: The Press and Democracy in Wartime. Washington, DC: Seven
Locks Press.
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Sharing of Media Products Within the CENTCOM Pools (January, 1991)
Pool participants and media organizations eligible to participate in the pools will
share all media products within their medium; e.g., television products will be shared by
all other television pool members and photo products will be shared with other photo
pool members. The procedures for sharing those products and the operating expenses of
the pool will be determined by the participants of each medium.
...
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Alert Procedures for Combat Correspondent Pool Activation (January, 1991)
When the pools are to be activated, the nB-Dhahran director or his designated
representative will call each ofthe pool coordinators and announce the activation ofthe
pools. The pool coordinators will be told when and where the pool members are to report
(the reporting time will be within-but not later than-two hours ofalert notification).
Operational security (OPSEC) considerations are of the utmost concern. nB
personnel, pool coordinators, and pool members need to be especially cognizant of
OPSEC. AU involved with the activation ofthe pools need to remain calm and
unexcited. Voice inflection, nervous behavior, etc., are all indicators that something
extraordinary is underway and could signal that operations are imminent.
Neither pool coordinators nor pool members will be told ofthe activation is an
"exercise" or actual "alert."
Pool members should report to the predesignated assembly area dressed for
deployment, with the appropriate equipment and supplies.
Recommendations for changes to pool membership or other procedures will be
considered on a case-by-case basis.
APPENDIXH
DOD PRINCIPLES FOR NEWS COVERAGE OF DOD OPERATrONS (1992)
Developed in May, 1992 by Pete WiUiams, Assistant Secretary ofDefense
(Public Affairs) and members ofthe media, following complaints by the media of the
pool system used during the Persian Gulf War.
R6
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DOD Principles for News Coverage of DOD Operations (1992)
The following principles have been adopted by representatives ofmajor American
news media and the Pentagon to be followed in any future combat situation involving
American troops.
Principles that should govern future arrangements for news coverage from the
battlefield of the United States military in combat:
1. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means ofcoverage of
U.S. military operations.
2. Pools are not to serve as the standard ofcovering U.S. military operations.
but pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means ofearly access to a military
operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity-
within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools will not cancel the
principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.
3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for
specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.
4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will
be required to abide by a clear set ofmilitary security ground rules that protect U.S.
forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspensions of the
credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News
organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat
operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.
5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special
-
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Operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.
6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere
with the reporting process.
7. Under conditions ofopen coverage, field commanders will pennitjoumalists
to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever possible. The military will be
responsible for the transportation ofpools.
8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to
enable timely, secure, compatible transmission ofpool material and will make these
facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when
government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means
available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news
organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may
require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.
9. These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DOD
National Media Pool System.
Accompanying Statement on Security Review
Note: The news organizations originally proposed J0 principles. One dealt with
security review and said: "News material-words and pictures-will not be subject to
security review." The Pentagon proposed instead a principal that said: "Military
operational security may require review ofnews material for conformance to reporting
ground rules." This fundamental disagreement could not be bridged, and representatives
ofthe press and the military issued their separate views on this matter, as follows.
-
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News Media Statement
The news organizations are convinced that journalists covering U.S. forces in
combat must be mindful at all times ofoperational security and the safety ofAmerican
lives. News organizations strongly believe that journalists will abide by clear operational
security ground rules. Prior security review is unwarranted and unnecessary.
We believe that the record in Operation Desert Stonn, Vietnam and other wars
supports the conclusion that journalists in the battlefield can be trusted to act responsibly.
We will challenge prior security review in the event that the Pentagon attempts to impose
it in some future military operation.
Department ofDefense Statement
The military believes that it must retain the option to review news material, to
avoid the inadvertent inclusion in news reports of information that could endanger troop
safety or the success of a mission. Any review system would be imposed only when
operational security is a consideration--for example, the very early stages ofa
contingency operation or sensitive periods in combat. If security review were imposed, it
would be used for one very limited purpose: to prevent disclosure of information which,
ifpublished, would jeopardize troop safety or the success of a military operation. Such a
review system would not be used to seek alterations in any other aspect of content or to
delay timely transmission of news material.
Security review would be perfonned by the military in the field, giving the
commander's representative the opportunity to address potential ground rule violations.
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The reporter would either change the story to meet ground rule concerns and file it, or file
it and flag for the editor whatever passages were in dispute. The editor would then call
the Pentagon to give the military one last chance to talk about potential ground rule
violations.
The Defense Department believes that the advantage of this system is that the
news organization would retain control of the material throughout the review and filing
process. The Pentagon would have two chances to address potential operational security
violations, but the news organization would make the final decision about whether to
publish the disputed information. Under Principle Four, violations of the ground rutes
could result in expulsion of the journalist involved from the combat zone.
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